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Abstract—Throughout scientific history, overarching theoreti-
cal frameworks have allowed researchers to grow beyond per-
sonal intuitions and culturally biased theories. They allow to
verify and replicate existing findings, and to link disconnected
results. The notion of self-play, albeit often cited in multiagent
Reinforcement Learning, has never been grounded in a formal
model. We present a formalized framework, with clearly defined
assumptions, which encapsulates the meaning of self-play as
abstracted from various existing self-play algorithms. This frame-
work is framed as an approximation to a theoretical solution
concept for multiagent training. On a simple environment, we
qualitatively measure how well a subset of the captured self-play
methods approximate this solution when paired with the famous
PPO algorithm. We also provide insights on interpreting quanti-
tative metrics of performance for self-play training. Our results
indicate that, throughout training, various self-play definitions
exhibit cyclic policy evolutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the classical single agent reinforcement learning (RL)
scenarios described by [1], where a stationary environment is
modelled by a Markov Decision Process (MDP), a solution
concept can be defined. MDPs are solved by computing a
policy which yields the highest possible episodic reward.
However, it is not clear how to define a pragmatic solution
concept when training a single policy in a multi-agent system,
for an agent’s optimal strategy is dependent on behaviours
of the other agents that inhabit the environment. An initial
solution is to compute the expected reward obtained by a given
policy defined over the entire set of all possible other policies
in the environment, which is intractable in all but toy scenarios.
To approximate this solution, traditional multi-agent RL
(MARL) methods would train and benchmark a policy against
a set of preexisting fixed agents, using as a success metric the
relative performance against these agents. These methods rest
on two assumptions. Firstly, the availability of benchmarking
policies at training and testing time. Secondly, these existing
policies dominate, in a game theoretical sense, most of the
policy space. Thus it would not be necessary to compute the
expectation over the entire policy space, using as a proxy an
expectation over the preexisting policies.
However, this approach features many flaws. if this bench-
marking set of is too small, the trained policy may overfit to the
This work was funded by the EPSRC Centre for Doctoral Training in
Intelligent Games and Game Intelligence (IGGI) EP/L015846/1.
behaviour of the agents it was trained with, and thus prone to
being exploitable by other policies. Furthermore, the validity
of the last assumption is rarely formally justified, favouring
empirical results.
What about the cases in which we don’t have access to these
learning resources? Such as when developing a new game for
which no prior expert information is known, and for which any
hand-crafted evaluation functions yields a fruitless policy. A
priori methods such as optimistic policy initialization are still
permitted [2]. Yet, under such constraints, there is little room
to compute a set of good benchmarking policies, let alone a
set of dominating policies.
Authors such as [3] began experimenting on self-play (SP).
SP is an open-ended learning training scheme which arises
in the context of multi-agent training. A SP training scheme
trains a learning agent purely by simulating plays with itself,
or with policies which have been generated during training.
These generated policies can dynamically build a set of
benchmarking policies during training. Such set can potentially
be curated to remove dominated or redundant policies.
Once we leave behind the limiting approach of training
against a fixed and known set of policies in favour of SP,
it is of paramount importance to define meaningful metrics to
inform this open-ended learning process. Fortunately, recent
years have seen the introduction of metrics for multiagent
evaluation, stemming from game theory [4] or dynamical
systems analysis [5].
Historically, SP lacks a formal definition, and notation is
often not shared among researchers. This has led to isolated,
and sometimes conflicting, conceptions of what constitutes
SP as a training scheme in MARL. It is our firm belief
that a formally-grounded framework with rigorous and unified
notation will strengthen the field of SP MARL and allow
for the creation of more nuanced and efficient contributions.
Incremental efforts on existing and future contributions can
now be captured on a shared language. This paper constitutes
a first step towards defining a generalizing framework under
which SP MARL methods can be inspected. Our contributions:
• A generalizing framework defined under formal notation
to describe SP algorithms in MARL.
• A unifying definition under the presented framework of
some prevalent SP algorithms from the literature.
• A qualitative and quantitative study of some SP algo-
rithms.
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2II. RELATED WORK
The notion of SP has been present in the game playing AI
community for over half a century. [3] discusses the notion
of learning a state-value function to evaluate board positions
in the game of checkers, to later inform a 1-ply tree search
algorithm to traverse more effectively the search space. This
learning process takes place as the opponent uses the same
state-value function, both playing agents updating simultane-
ously the shared state-value function. Such training fashion
was named self-play. The TD-Gammon algorithm [6] featured
SP to learn a policy using TD(λ) [1] to reach expert level
backgammon play. This approach surpassed previous work by
the same author, which derived a backgammon playing policy
by performing supervised learning on expert datasets [7].
More recently, AlphaGo [8] used a combination of supervised
learning on expert moves and SP to beat the world champion
Go player. This algorithm was later refined [9], removing the
need for expert human moves. A policy was learnt purely by
using an mix of supervised learning on moves generated by SP
and Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), as presented in [10].
These works echo the sentiment that superhuman AI needs not
be limited or biased by preexisting human knowledge.
It is often assumed that a training scheme can be defined
as SP if, and only if, all agents in an environment follow the
same policy, corresponding to the latest version of the policy
being trained. Meaning that, when the learning agent’s policy
is updated, every single agent in the environment mirrors this
policy update. We refer to this SP method as naive SP. [11]
relaxes this assumption by allowing some agents to follow the
policies of “past-selves”. Instead of replicating the same policy
over all agents, the policy of all of the non-training agents can
also come from a set of fixed “historical” policies. This set
is built as training progresses, by taking checkpoints1 of the
policy being trained. At the beginning of a training episode,
policies are uniformly sampled from this “historical” policy set
and define the behaviour of some of the environment’s agents.
The authors claim that such version of SP aims at training
a policy which is able to defeat random older versions of
itself, ensuring continual learning. This notion of a “choosing
policies from a historical set” allows for two decision points:
(1) Which agents will be added into this “historical” set
of policies and (2) which of these agents will populate the
environment. Different takes on (1) and (2) spawn different
SP algorithms.
From this scenario, consider the following: each com-
bination of fixed policies sampled as opponents from the
“historical” dataset can be considered as a separate MDP. This
is because by leaving a single agent learning in a stationary
environment, the fixed agents’ influence on the environment
is stationary [12]. This is of genuine importance, given that
most RL algorithms’ convergence properties heavily rely on
the assumption of a stationary environment [13]. SP algorithms
can leverage the assumption that they are using SP, so they
can provide the learning agent with a label denoting which
combination of agent behaviours inhabits the environment, a
1For deep RL, this is equivalent to freezing the weights of the neural
networks to represent an agent’s policy.
powerful assumption in transfer learning [14] and multi-task
learning [15]. In fact, there already are multitask meta-RL
algorithms which assume knowledge of a distribution over
MDPs which the agent is being trained on, such as RL2 [16].
Note that a SP algorithm featuring a growing set of “historical”
policies will introduce a non-stationary distribution over the
policies that will inhabit the environment during training. It
ensues that the distribution over the set of MDPs encountered
by the training agent becomes non-stationary.
Recently, [17] trained a team of RL agents using SP to
achieve superhuman level performance in the competitive
team-based game of Dota 2. During training, the team would
play 80% of the games using naive SP while the remaining
20% were played against “past-selves”. The probability of
facing any of these previous policies depends on a per-policy
metric (which is updated during training) evaluating how much
is there to learn from a policy. AlphaStar [18] reached Grand-
master level in StarCraft II with various policies by using
a combination of various SP algorithms [19]. Part of their
training pipeline relied on training a set of “exploiter” policies
which focus on exploitining specific policies under training,
relaxing the need for them to be robust to all opponents.
[20] Defines the Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO)
family of algorithms, unifying various game theoretical al-
gorithms for multiagent training. PSRO algorithms tackle
this problem by iteratively generating monotonically stronger
policies relative to an existing set of policies. These algorithms
iterate over the following loop: a meta-game (definition in
Section III) is defined over the current set of policies, for which
a “solution“ is computed, and from this solution one or more
policies are added to the set of policies. The choice of solution
concept and the procedure to generate new policies from this
concept is the differentiating factor between PSRO algorithms.
There are current efforts to show convergence properties of
some PSRO algorithms [21] [4] towards existing multiagent
solutions [5]. Our contribution shares the spirit of creating a
generalised framework to encompass existing algorithms, but
with a focus on MARL literature instead of game theory.
III. PRELIMINARY NOTATION
Cursive lowercase letters represent scalars (n). Bold lowercase,
vectors (pi ∈ Rn). Bold uppercase, matrices (A ∈ Rn×n).
A. Normal form games
A normal form game is a tuple (Π, U , n) where n is
the number of players, Π = (Π1, . . . ,Πn) is the set of joint
policies, one for each player. U : Π → Rn is a payoff table
mapping each joint policy to a scalar utility for each player.
Rational players try to maximize their own expected utility.
Each player i does so by selecting a policy from Πi or
equivalently by sampling from a mixture (distribution) over
them pii ∈ ∆(Πi). The value vi for a player i given a policy
vector pi is the expected payoff obtained by player i if all
players follow pi, vi = Ui(pi).
A (possibly mixed) policy pii is a best response for player
i against all other players’ policies pi−i if playing pii yields
player i the highest possible payoff against strategies pi−i,
pii ∈ BR(pi−i). A Nash Equilibrium is a policy profile (one
3policy for each player) such that each player’s policy is a
best response against all other player policies. ∀i ∈ {n}, pii ∈
BR(pi−i). A Nash Equilibrium is maximally entropic (maxent
Nash) if each player’s policy is maximally indifferent between
actions with the same empirical performance.
A game is zero-sum if ∀pi ∈ Π, 1 · U(Π) = 0, otherwise
it is a general-sum game. A game is symmetric if all players
feature the same policy set (Π1 = . . . = Πn) and the payoff
associated to each joint policy depends only on the policies
and not on the identity of the players. 2 player normal form
games (n = 2) are typically defined by a tuple (A, B), where
A ∈ R|Π1|×|Π2| gives the payoff for player 1 (row player),
and B ∈ R|Π1|×|Π2| gives the payoff for player 2 (column
player). If B = AT the game is symmetric. Most importantly
for us, if B = −A the game is zero-sum. Exploiting this
equality, 2-player zero-sum games are often represented by a
single matrix A containing the payoffs for player 1.
Given a vector of n agents pi for an arbitrary game, also
known as a population, let Wpi ∈ R
n×n denote an empirical
winrate matrix also known as a meta-game. The entry wi,j
for i, j ∈ {n} represents the winrate of many head-to-head
matches of policy pii when playing against policy pij for the
given game. A meta-game can be thought of as an abstraction
of the underlying game, in which a players’ actions consist
of choosing policies from the population rather than primitive
game actions. A meta-game’s empirical winrate matrixWpi for
a given population pi can be considered as a payoff matrix for
a 2-player zero-sum game. It is possible to define an empirical
winrate matrix over two (or more) populationsWpi1,pi2 , such
that each player chooses agents from a different population.
An evaluation matrix [4] is a meta-game represented by an
antisymmetric matrix A. One can turn an empirical winrate
matrix W into an antisymmetric matrix by performing the
element wise operation ai,j = wi,j −
1
2 , shifting the range of
each entry from [0, 1] to [− 12 ,
1
2 ]. Symmetrical 2-player zero-
sum games represented by an antisymmetric matrix A feature
a unique maxent Nash [4], a fact we will use in Section V.
Finally, the relative population performance [4] is a
population-level meassure of performance. Given two popu-
lations pi1,pi2, it yields a single scalar value comparing the
performance of pi1 against pi2. It is computed by generating an
evaluation matrix for both populations Api1,pi2 which is then
treated as a 2-player zero-sum game. A Nash equilibrium is
then computed (npi1 ,npi2) for the zero-sum game defined by
Api1,pi2 . The relative population performance is the value v
for the meta-player 1: v = npi1 · Api1,pi2 · n
T
pi2
. A positive v
indicates that pi1 wins on average against population pi2, with
the opposite being true if v is negative, v = 0 indicates both
populations are equivalent.
B. Multiagent Reinforcement Learning
Let E represent a multi-agent system with n agents and
a reward discount factor γ. This environment E features a
state space S, a joint observation space O = O1 × . . . × On
and a joint action space A = A1 × . . . × An, where Oi
and Ai represent the observation and action space for the
ith agent respectively. Let the (potentially stochastic) mapping
from observations to actions pii : Oi → Ai represent the
policy for the ith agent, and pi = [pi1, . . . , pin] the joint policy
vector, containing the policy for each agent in E. The joint
policy vector pi can also be regarded as a distribution over the
joint action space conditioned on the joint observation space
pi : O→ A. Let Π = Π1× . . .×Πn be the joint policy space,
where Πi is the policy space for agent i. As before, let Π−i
denote the joint policy space for all agents except agent i.
The solution to this environment E for an agent i is
to compute a policy which maximizes its expected reward
obtained when acting in an environment across the entire set
of all possible other policies Π−i in the environment:
pi∗ = argmax
pi∈Πi
∫
pi
−i⊆Π−i
Eat∼pi;st+1,rt∼P (st,at)[
∞∑
t=0
γtrt]
(1)
An iteration, or episode, of the classical MARL loop goes
as follows: The environment presents all agents with a vector
containing all individual agent observations ot = [o
1
t , . . . , o
n
t ]
based on its state st. The vector containing the actions of all
agents is sampled from the joint policy vector at ∼ pi(ot).
The environment then executes the action vector at, transition-
ing to a new state st+1 and yielding both a new observation
ot+1 and a reward vector rt containing an observation and
reward for each agent. This loop is repeated until a terminal
state is reached, after which a new episode begins.
IV. GENERALIZED SELF-PLAY FRAMEWORK
Here we present the mathematical formulation, and required
assumptions, for a formal framework which encapsulates the
notion of self-play in the context of MARL. It allows for the
creation and comparison of existing and future SP algorithms.
Self-play training schemes can be conceived as modules
which extend the MARL loop by introducing a functionality
prior to, and after, every episode. Let pi be the only policy
being trained throughout the MARL loop. An SP scheme
envelops the MARL loop by first deciding which policies
pi′, taken from a set of fixed policies pi′ ⊆ pio, will define
the agents’ behaviour for the next episode. This excludes the
agent whose behaviour is defined by pi. Once the episode ends,
a function G decides whether or not the (possibly updated)
policy pi will be introduced in the pool of available policies
pio. This intuition is formally captured in Algorithm 1, which
presents a SP scheme inside a Partially Observable Stochastic
Game (POSG) loop. Algorithm 1 defines an n-player, general-
sum, partially-observable environment. The steps belonging to
the SP scheme have been highlighted in orange.
A. Framework definition
We define a SP module or training scheme by formalizing
the notions of the menagerie pio, the policy sampling distri-
bution Ω, and the gating function G. Specified by the tuple
< Ω(·|·, ·), G(·|·, ·) >:
• pio ⊆ Πi; The menagerie. A set of policies from
which agents’ behaviour will be sampled. This set always
includes the currently training policy pi. A constraint is
4Algorithm 1: (POSG) RL Loop with Self-Play.
Input: Environment: (S,A,O,P(·, ·|·, ·),R(·, ·), ρ0)
Input: Self-Play Scheme: (Ω(·|·, ·), G(·|·, ·))
Input: Policy to be trained: pi ∈ Πi
1 pio = {pi} ; // Menagerie initialization
2 for e = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
3 pi′ ∼ Ω(pio, pi) ; // Sample from menagerie
4 pi = pi′ ∪ {pi};
5 s0,o0 ∼ ρ0;
6 for t = 0, . . . , termination do
7 at ∼ pi(ot);
8 st+1,ot+1 ∼ P (st,at);
9 rt ∼ R(st,at);
10 t← t+ 1;
11 end
12 pi ← update(pi);
13 pio ∼ G(pio, pi) ; // Curate menagerie
14 end
15 return pi;
placed over pio. All of its elements must be derived, at
least indirectly, from pi, the policy being trained. Hence,
all policies in the menagerie are elements of pi’s policy
space. The menagerie can change as training progresses
by the curator function described below.
• Ω(pi′ ∈ Π−i|pi
o ⊆ Πi, pi ∈ Πi) ∈ [0, 1]; where pi
′ ⊆ pio;
The policy sampling distribution. A probability distribu-
tion over the menagerie pio, the set of available policies.
It is conditioned on the menagerie pio and the current
policy pi being trained. It chooses which policies, apart
from pi, will inhabit the environment’s agents.
• G(pio′ ⊆ Πi|pi
o ⊆ Πi, pi ∈ Πi) ∈ [0, 1]; The curator or
gating function, of the menagerie. A possibly stochastic
function whose parameters are the current training policy
pi and a menagerie pio. The curator serves two purposes,
which complex curators could break into two functions:
– G decides if the current policy pi will be introduced
in the menagerie.
– G decides which policies in the menagerie, pi ∈ pio,
will be discarded from the menagerie.
The curator bears resemblance with the notion of Hall of Fame
from evolutionary algorithms [22]. As Hall of Fame algorithms
also consider the problem of curating a policy set over time.
B. Assumptions
Our SP framework explicitly assumes the following:
Assumption 1.1: The policies present in the environment can
either be exact copies of the policy being trained, or policies
derived indirectly from it, taken from the menagerie.
Assumption 1.2: Prior, during and after a training episode,
the SP module has access to the agents’ policy representa-
tions2. Allowing any-time read and write rights for all policies.
2If the policies are being represented by a neural network. Access to
the policy representation means access to the neural network topology and
weights.
The definitions above capture the minimal structure of all
SP training schemes. However, it is possible to condition both
the policy sampling distribution Ω and curator G on any other
variables. For instance, it could be interesting to define an
SP algorithm whose components are conditioned on episode
trajectories, which has proved useful in RL research [23], and
is required for policy gradient algorithms [24].
Our SP framework does not make any assumptions on the
environment with which the policies interact.
C. Self-play as an approximation to the multiagent solution
Assumption 1: There exists a set of policies, pi ⊆ Π, signifi-
cantly smaller than the entire original policy space, |pi| ≪ |Π|,
which we can use as a proxy for Π in equation 1. If so, the
integration over the policy space, becomes computationally
tractable. Making equation 1 computationally solvable.
The policy sampling distribution Ω and the gating function
G are tools by which a menagerie pio can be computed and
curated over time. Self-play can be conceived as a bottom up
approach towards computing a set of policies, pio, to be used
as a proxy for the entire policy space Π in equation 1. The
obvious fact that an agent cannot act according to a policy
outside its policy space means that a menagerie can only
contain policies of a single policy space. Consequently, for
environments with disjoint policy spaces, SP may be unable
to serve as an approximate solution to equation 1.
[4] introduces the notion of the gamescape, a polytope
which geometrically encodes interactions between agents for
zero-sum games. They derive a set of algorithms whose goal
is to grow and curate an approximation to this polytope. We
draw parallels between their work and the idea of using SP
algorithms to compute a proxy for a target policy space.
V. SELF-PLAY ALGORITHMS
We demonstrate the generalizing capabilities of our frame-
work by presenting four prevalent SP schemes from MARL
literature. Let pi be a policy being trained, and pio a menagerie:
1) Naive Self-Play: The is the oldest and simplest SP
algorithm, originating in [3]. The premise is that every agent
in the environment is populated with the latest version of the
policy being trained. All agents share the same behaviour.
To capture this, the policy sampling distribution Ω puts all
probability weight to the latest pi.
Ω(pi′|pio, pi) =
{
1 ∀pi′ ∈ pi′ : pi′ == pi
0 otherwise
In this degenerate scenario the gating function G always
deterministically inserts the latest version of the training policy
into the menagerie, discarding the previous menagerie entirely.
G(pio, pi) = {pi}
2) δ-Uniform Self-Play: Introduced by [11] and mentioned
in Section II. This SP scheme treats the menagerie as a set
of “historical” policies. The authors wanted to create an SP
scheme that ensured continual learning by training a policy
which could consistently beat random older versions of itself.
5LetM = |pio| be the size of the menagerie, and let δ ∈ [0, 1]
denote the percentage threshold on the oldest policy to be
considered as a potential candidate to be sampled from pio by
Ω. Thus, δ = 0 corresponds to all policies in the menagerie
being considered as candidates, and δ = 1 only allows the last
policy introduced in the menagerie to be sampled by Ω. After
computing the set of candidate policies following this criteria,
the authors use a uniform distribution to sample from it.
Ω(pi′|pio, pi) = Uniform(δM,M)
The gating function G used in δ-uniform-self-play is fully
inclusive and deterministic. After every episode, it always
inserts the training policy into the menagerie.
G(pio, pi) = pio ∪ {pi}
3) Population Based Training Self-Play: As introduced
in [19], Population Based Training SP is a parallel SP al-
gorithm influenced by evolutionary algorithms. Each agent is
independently learning on their own SP augmented MARL
loop. The menagerie, initialized with a population of random
policies, is shared amongst all learning agents. The menagerie
is treated as the population of an evolutionary algorithm.
The policy sampling distribution chooses opponents from
the menagerie which are similar in skill to the currently
training agent. Where agent skill is meassured by Elo ratings.
The gating function is analogous to the selection, crossover
and mutation phases of an evolutionary algorithm. It modifies
and changes the menagerie by dropping low performing agents
and introducing evolved versions of the existing population.
4) Policy-Spaced Response Oracles (PSRO): A family of
algorithms introduced in [20]. Such algorithms maintain an
empirical winrate matrix Wpio generated from a menagerie
pio, and are parameterized via the choice of two functions:
• M(Wpio ∈ R
|pio|×|pio|) ∈ ∆(pio). The meta-game
solver, which takes a meta-game and outputs a “meta-
game solution”, a distribution over the policies of the
menagerie.
• O(pi ∈ Π,pi′ ∈ ∆(pio)) ∈ Π. The oracle, which takes
a distribution over policies pi′, a starting policy pi and
derives a new policy pi∗ which performs better against
pi′ than pi.
The function of the meta-game solver M is captured by
our policy sampling distribution Ω, as they both output a
probability distribution over a set of policies, the menagerie.
After the oracle computes a new policy, it is added to the
meta-game, and the empirical winrate matrixWpio is updated
via game simulations.
M operates on a meta-game generated by doing head-to-
head matches between all policies in the menagerie, whereas
a policy sampling distribution Ω operates directly on the
menagerie. In this paper we use M = maxent-Nash [25].
As stated in Section III, we can turn a winrate matrix into
an antisymmetric evaluation matrix, which we know has a
unique maxent Nash. This uniqueness feature is valuable for
consistent interpretability. Other alternatives exist [5] [21].
Ω(pi′|pio, pi) =M(meta-game(pi′))
The functionality of the oracle can be anything that gener-
ates a new policy, such as an RL algorithm or evolutionary
algorithm amongst other options. Upon completion of the
oracle function, a new policy is added to the meta-game.
To this extent, the oracle O and our curator function G are
analogous in so far as both functions decide when a policy is
introduced in the menagerie. The curator has the advantage of
also being able of remove policies from the menagerie.
The extent to which PSRO and our framework overlap is
left for future work.
VI. PROPOSED INCREMENTAL INNOVATIONS
In this section we present a novel policy sampling distri-
bution that alleviates on the shortcomings of the δ-Uniform
sampling distribution and a novel qualitative metric for the
efficiency of the menagerie when it comes to using it as a
proxy to the whole policy space. This shows how minimal
incremental changes to existing methods, within the context
of a general framework, can lead to improvements.
1) δ-Limit Uniform policy sampling distribution: In super-
vised learning approaches, training datasets are fixed before
training commences. This yields a stationary distribution from
which training examples are drawn. RL suffers from sequential
and correlated data collection during training, rendering a non-
stationary distribution over training samples.
We analyze a property of the δ-Uniform SP algorithm.
As stated earlier, it aims to generate an agent which can
defeat random versions of itself. However, this is affected
by the sequential data collection curse of RL methods. By
sampling uniformly at random from a menagerie, we observe
a bias of the policies sampled from Ω towards earlier policies.
Intuitively, earlier policies are sampled more often by virtue
of being electable to sampling more times than recently added
policies. Computing a policy which generalizes against a
broad set of policies is desirable. However, we worry that by
sampling earlier policies too often the learning policy will be
biased towards interacting with, often random, initial agents.
This worry is furthered by empirical evidences stating that,
in certain board games, the quality of the fixed policies being
used during training is directly proportional to potential quality
of the policy being trained [26].
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Fig. 1: Histograms of sample rates for policies inside a menagerie
for two sample training runs. The horizontal orange line represents
a Uniform(0, 500) distribution.
6With this in mind, we present a novel policy sampling
distribution, named δ-Limit Uniform, that gives increased
probability to later policies. An attempt to amend the δ-
Uniform bias. Figure 1 shows the histograms of the number
of samples per policy for both δ = 0-Uniform and δ = 0-
Limit Uniform, clearly showing how the δ-Limit Uniform
distribution avoids biasing towards earlier policies.
Let |pion| be the size of the menagerie at the be-
ginning of the n-th episode. pie is the e-th policy to
have entered the menagerie (asserting e ≤ n). The
logit probability ρne and normalized probability p
n
e of
sampling pie for the n-th SP episode are computed as
ρne =
1
|pion|(|pi
o
n| − e)
2
, (2) p
n
e =
ρne∑|pion|
i=0 ρ
n
i
. (3)
2) Qualitative Metric for the Menagerie’s Efficiency: A
visual metric, aimed at understanding how well a menagerie
approximates the entire policy space. Policies can be charac-
terised by the behaviours/state trajectories they produce when
acting in the multi-agent environment. Thus, assessing the span
of the state trajectories induced by the SP training enables
an assessment of the span of the policies living inside the
menagerie, which is what we mean by assessing how well a
menagerie approximates the whole policy space. This visual
display comes from a 2D embedding of the state trajectories
experienced by an agent during each training episode. We
use t-SNE [27] to project the multi-dimensional, environment
specific representation of state trajectories unto a 2D space.
Other dimensionality reduction algorithms can be used. We
propose two visual cues:
• Density Heightmap: visualization of the density function
yielded by the embedded state trajectories, computed
via a kernel density estimation method. Intuitively, it
gives insight towards understanding where, inside the
embedded state trajectory space, the agent has spent most
time on during training. It is valuable providing we can
label some subsets of the embedding space with high-
level understanding of what is happening throughout the
state trajectories.
• Time Window-Avegared SP induced trajectories: vi-
sualization of the temporal evolution of the average
embedded trajectory/episode for an agent during training.
Computed by uniformly dividing the time-sorted embed-
ded trajectories in buckets, with the window-averaged tra-
jectory being the median trajectory, computed in the 2D
embedding space, of each bucket. Intuitively, it displays
which parts of the embedded trajectory space the agent
has traversed throughout training. This cue can be used
to visually assess to what extent an agent is prone to
re-visit some areas of the trajectory space, which can
help identify catastrophic forgetting and cyclic policy
evolutions.
t-SNE projected representations vary depending on the data
used as input. For our purposes it means that if we were
to separately embed two sets of different state trajectories,
we might not be able to meaningfully compare both separate
embeddings. We tackle this problem with two measures:
(1) We compute a basis of possible state trajectories using
some environment-specific heuristics that enables the basis to
span over most of the whole state trajectory space. The number
of basis state trajectories computed is of the same order as
the number of state trajectories generated during training.
(2) When comparing two or more sets of state trajectories
generated by different algorithms, we compute the embeddings
of each algorithm-induced state trajectories all at once via
an aggregated set of state trajectories. Thus, it allows for
meaningful comparisons across state trajectory embeddings
from different algorithms.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
A. Experiment description
We now present the environments, evaluation metrics, RL
algorithms and SP schemes used in our experiment.
1) Environment: Repeated imperfect Recall Rock Paper
Scissors (RirRPS) as introduced in [28]. An extended form,
imperfect imformation, two-player, zero-sum, simultaneous
version of Rock Paper Scisors. The agent which obtains the
highest cumulative reward by the end of the last repetition is
considered the winner. Ties are broken uniformly at random.
We choose a repeated game and not a single round because
repeatability introduces explotability, which increases with
the number of repetitions. In our experiments we use 10
repetitions, with a recall of the last 3 joint actions.
RirRPS is a highly (but not fully) cyclic game. In fully
cyclic games, improving an agent’s performance against an-
other agent is always counterbalanced by a decrease in perfor-
mance against other possible agents, implying that invididual
agent improvement is inconsequential [4].
TABLE I: PPO hyperparameters used for both experiments.
Hyperparameter Qualitative study Quantitative study
Horizon (T) 2048 128
Adam stepsize 3× 10−4 10−5
Num. epochs 10 10
Minibatch size 64 16
Discount (γ) 0.99 0.99
GAE parameter (λ) 0.95 0.95
Entropy coeff. 0.01 0.01
Clipping parameter (ǫ) 0.2 0.2
2) Algorithmic choices: For our qualitative studies we
used Proximal Policy Optimization [29] where the underlying
policy is represented by either by a feedforward neural network
(MLP-PPO) or a recurrent architecture (RNN-PPO). Four our
quantitative studies we only use MLP-PPO.
3) Self-Play choices: We train a PPO agent on a SP
extended MARL loop as shown in Algorithm 1:
• Naive SP
• δ-Uniform and δ-Limit Uniform, where the value of δ is
specified each time.
• PSRO(M = maxent-Nash, O = Best Response). Such
oracle is governed by two hyperparameters, which play
a role in determining whether the training agent has
converged to a best response: (1) The winrate w ∈ [0, 1] at
which it is considered that the current agent has conveged
7and (2) the number of episodes nmatches that will be
used to compute the aforementioned winrate. We used
w = 72%, nmatches = 50.
For all SP training schemes, the initial menagerie contains
a copy of the initial policy, with randomly initialized weights.
4) Evaluation metrics:
a) Winrate matrices: SP algorithms train / modify a
policy pi overtime. We can consider an SP scheme sp as a
generative process, which we can query at any time t to obtain
the latest version of pi being trained by sp, pit ∼ sp. This is
analogous to creating checkpoints in training at which to freeze
a copy of the policy pi being trained. We only freeze pit and not
the menagerie piot . Thus, we can generate a population which
represents the evolution of the policy training under an SP
algorithm overtime, pisp = [pit0 , pit1 , . . . ]. By examining the
evaluation matrix generated from this population Wpisp we
can quantitatively examine if different SP algorithms suffer
from catastrophic forgetting or cyclic policy evolutions.
b) Evolution of relative population performance: As
introduced in Section III, we shall use the relative population
performance as a direct meassure of the relative quality be-
tween the populations spawned by two different SP algorithms.
We are interested in how this relative performance evolves
overtime. Below we describe the algorithm to obtain such
evolution: Given a set of SP training algorithms SP :
1) For each sp ∈ SP sample a population pisp of n agents.
2) For each population pair (pisp1 ,pisp2), sp1, sp2 ∈ SP ,
compute an evaluation matrix Apisp1 ,pisp2 between both
populations.
3) Compute Asub = {A1...i×1...i : i ∈ {n}}, which
represents all submatrices of Apisp1 ,pisp2 .
4) Compute the evolution of relative population perfor-
mance associated with each submatrix Ai ∈ Asub,
vsp1,sp2 = [vAi ] ∈ R
n.
Evaluation matrices are expensive to compute:O(n2) where
n is the population size. There is current research on reducing
the computational load of generating evaluation matrices [30].
The procedure outlined above uses a single evaluation matrix
to compute the relative population performances for all sub-
matrices, meaning that we can recycle the empirical winrate
matrix used to generate the evaluation matrices. Throughout
this paper, to compute the winrate for an entry wi,j in an
empirical winrate matrix W we use 30 simulations.
VIII. RESULTS
A. Qualitative analysis
Figure 2 shows the 2D t-SNE state trajectory embeddings
for all combinations of SP algorihtm & RL algorithm intro-
duced in the previous section. Each training session lasted for
a 1e4 episodes on the RirRPS environment.
Each SP agent using naive SP and δ = 0-Limit Uniform
exhibits cyclic catastrophic forgetting as their time window-
averaged trajectories in the embedded space display cyclic
movement, whereas δ = 0-Uniform’s time window-averaged
trajectories seem less affected.
Especially in the cases of the δ = 0-Limit Uniform and
Naive SPs, the Density Heightmaps of RNN-PPO seem to be
made of plateaus whereas the ones of MLP-PPO are made of
picks, indicating that recurrent policies seem to further spread
the menagerie over the whole policy space to some greater
extent compared to feedforward policies.
Comparing δ = 0 Uniform and δ = 0-Limit Uniform
SPs, we can observe a progressive and somewhat ordered
exploration of the policy space by the former. δ = 0-Uniform’s
Time Window-averaged SP episode trajectories visit each fixed
agent clusters one by one. Since the former biases towards
earlier policies that have entered the menagerie when sampling
opponent, we hypothesize that this time-related bias is entering
in synergy with the learning rate of the trained policy. Indeed,
after behaving like a Rock Agent (green cluster), the trained
policy starts to behave like a Paper Agent (purple cluster) as
the Rock Agent-behaving policies that have entered in the
menagerie progressively starts to be sampled as opponent.
Both the MLP-PPO- and RNN-PPO-equipped agents exhibit
that cyclic and ordered exploration of the embedding space.
B. Quantitative analysis
The results from Figure 3 are metrics gathered on a single
training run due to the computational requirements of averag-
ing results over many runs. However, the behaviour captured
is a representative sample of many training runs.
Each row i of winrate matrixW represents the winrates of
policy at checkpoint i against all other policies checkpointed
during training. Thus, for any given row i, the entries left of the
diagonal (wi,j , ∀j < i) indicate winrates against policies from
earlier checkpoints in training, or older policies. Conversely,
entries right of the diagonal (wi,j , ∀j > i) denote winrates of
policy i against later checkpoints, or newer policies. Diagonal
entries represent the winrate of a policy against itself, which
is always 50%. An ideal training scheme which would always
compute monotonically better policies as training progressed
would yield a winrate matrix where the lower triangular
indices would show positive winrates (higher than 50%) and
the upper triangular would show negative winrates (lower than
50%). In other words, a policy would always win against
previous versions of itself, and lose against newer ones.
We turn our focus to the winrate matrices from Figure 3. As
discussed, Naive SP uses as opponent an identical version of
the policy being trained, and thus the underlying RL algorithm
tries to compute a best response against itself. This is clearly
manifested in the winrate matrix in Figure 3.A. The entries
just left of the diagonal show positive winrates, and those just
right of the diagonal show negative winrates. This means that
the training policy learns how to beat the last version of itself.
Figure 3.C shows the evolution of the policy training under
δ = 0.5-Uniform (Half history). This policy attempts to
compute a best response against the later half of its history.
We see that on average, for a given row i, the corresponding
policy tends to win against policies j ∈ [ i2 , i − 1]. Note that
policies immediately outside the moving window determined
by the choice of δ = 0.5 feature a negative winrate, suggesting
the training policy does not generalize to policies outside of
the menagerie in RirRPS.
δ = 0-Uniform (Figure 3.D), whose underlying policy
attempts a best response against its entire history, shows a
8Fig. 2: Density Heightmap and Time Window-averaged SP-induced of episode trajectories in the computed 2D t-SNE state trajectory
embedding space. Top-Left: Naive SP with MLP-PPO. Bottom-Left: Naive SP with RNN-PPO. Top-Centre: δ = 0-Uniform SP with
MLP-PPO. Bottom-Centre δ = 0-Uniform SP with RNN-PPO. Top-Right: δ = 0-Limit Uniform SP with MLP-PPO. Bottom-Right:
δ = 0-Limit Uniform SP with RNN-PPO. RirRPS environment, 1e4 SP training episodes. Green, purple, and red-colored clusters are
embeddings of state trajectories resulting of pitting, respectively, RockAgent, PaperAgent, and ScissorsAgent against a RandomAgent. The
scattered blue dots represents the individual projection of each one of the 10e4 trajectories. Their density heightmaps are represented
through dashed contours. The time-sorted training trajectories experienced by the SP agents were divided into 20 time-windows, and a
centroid (median trajectory) was computed for each. Consecutive centroids have been linked by arrows, creating the Time Window-averaged
SP-induced episode trajectories. Starting at the black dot, their progression is highlighted via the rainbow colour transitions.
Fig. 3: Empirical winrate matrices showing the evolution of 6 policies where each one is being trained via a different SP algorithm in
RirRPS. For every SP training process, we sample a policy after every policy update for a total of 100 policy checkpoints and 12800 training
episodes. Treating each matrix as the payoff matrix for a symmetrical 2-player zero-sum game, we present on top of of each matrix the
support received by each policy on the Nash equilibrium of such game. This support gives a measure of quality of each individual policy
with respect to the other policies in the population. Blue / red indicates positive / negative winrates for column player.
close-to-ideal empirical winrate matrix insofar as any given
policy i beats most previous versions of itself and loses against
later ones. Also, for any subgame of Figure 3.D the largest
concentration of support under Nash consistently lays on the
latest policies.
PSRO’s winrate matrix, depicted in Figure 3.E, does follow
a positive trend, although less so than δ = 0-Uniform, as
checkpoints beyond the 37th lose against policies 20 to 26,
which worsens as later policies are introduced. Interestingly,
the policy featuring the largest support under Nash is the
34th checkpoint. This does not necessarily mean that all 66
checkpoints that came after it were weaker in comparison.
The quality of a policy (in terms of support under Nash)
can vary greatly when policies are added or dropped from
the population. For instance, if we consider a subgame of
Figure 3.E taking only the first 92 checkpoints, we would
find that the 92nd policy features the largest support under
Nash around 3%, yet it falls around 1% on the game from
Figure 3.E.
IX. DISCUSSION
a) Cyclic policy evolutions: As expected, naive SP
clearly features a cyclic policy evolution. As previously stated,
an ideal SP would yield policies that always beat previous
ones. In contrast, almost all checkpoints obtained during
naive SP training cycle between losing and winning against
9previous and future checkpoints. This is further evidenced by
the support under Nash from Figure 3.A, where under Nash
equilibrium many policies share the highest amount support
(around 3%). We observed similar cyclic behaviour in δ = 0-
Limit Uniform in Figure 3.B and in δ = 0.5-Limit Uniform
(not shown). Which may entail that δ-Limit Uniform SPs
over-correct the bias towards earlier policies, matching our
observations on the previous qualitative analysis.
δ = 0-Uniform (Full history) does not exhibit a cyclic policy
evolution. Full history tends towards generating monotonically
better policies. That is, on average any given checkpoint is
able to obtain positive winrates when matched against previous
checkpoints. Hence, we claim that full history SP is an apt SP
scheme for cyclic environments, given enough computational
time. On the other hand, policies trained via δ = 0.5-Uniform
SP seem to struggle to reliably defeat all previous versions
of themselves. Hence in RirRPS we see that by excluding the
earlier half of the history, the latest policy becomes exploitable
by earlier policies. Note that half history’s winrate matrix
features more pronounced winrates (entries are either closer
to 100% or 0% winrate) than the equivalent entries in full
history’s winrate matrix. This is a result of δ = 0.5-Uniform’s
menagerie being smaller than δ = 0-Uniform’s counterpart,
which leads the training policy to overfit against the policies
in the menagerie, which in turn allow earlier policies to exploit
it.
PSRO (Figure 3.E) does show signs of forgetting, as stated
in the previous section. As training progresses, later policies
begin to lose against previous ones, with this effect growing
larger overtime.
b) Relative population performances: Figure 4 shows
the evolution of population performances comparing the per-
formance of naive SP against the SP algorithms from Fig-
ure 3. Interestingly, when we look at the evolution of relative
population performance we notice that it converges near zero
for all SP algorithms. For RirRPS, this implies that the
populations generated by all SP as training progresses are of
similar quality, furthering the idea that in highly cyclic games
individual policy improvement is not meaningful, even when
there is potential to exploitation due to repetitions in RirRPS.
However, we are surprised to find naive SP performing better
than δ = 0-Uniform and PSRO, which is not obvious by just
looking at the winrate matrices from Figure 3.
A possible reason why naive SP performs evenly or posi-
tively against all other SP algorithms is that early on in training
it quickly cycles through rock / paper / scissors policies, and
from those three policies it is possible to compose almost any
policy in RirRPS.
c) Fragility of PSRO’s oracle hyperparameters: Small
changes in the oracle’s hyperparameters (winrate threshold w,
window size of match outcomes nmatches) can quickly lead
to unfeasibly long training times (too many policies added
to the menagerie) or arguably degenerate behaviour by the
SP algorithm (the curator never introduces new policies into
the menagerie). In the worst case scenario, the training policy
will never convege towards a best response against the initial
(randomly initialized) policy in the menagerie. We show in
Table II a sweep over both hyperparameters in RirRPS. Most
Fig. 4: Evolution of relative population performance of naive SP
against 4 other SP schemes. The cyclic behaviour of naive SP quickly
discovers how to play Rock, Paper and Scissors, which are enough
to generate a Nash equilibrium, which explains the initial positive
relative performance.
of the training time is spent inside of the meta-game solverM,
which leads us to believe that a less computationally intensive
meta-game solver should be used.
A Nash Equilibrium in RirRPS is to act randomly, which
we argue is likely the behaviour of the training policy at the
beginning of training. Hence, it is highly unlikely that a policy
will obtain a high enough winrate against this random policy to
be added to the menagerie, making it difficult for the learning
policy to discover policies which differ from random play. This
means that the policy will not discover how to exploit policies
beyond random play.
TABLE II: Hyperparameter sweep time profiling for 12k
episodes in RirRPS. Columns M and Wpio represent the
percentage of training time spent on computing a meta-game
solution and updating the meta-game respectively.
Hyperparameter values M W
pi
o Total training time |pio|
(60%, 30) 95% 2% >2d 332
(70%, 30) 95% 5% 1d 12h 44m 294
(75%, 30) 70% 25% 1h 38m 139
(80%, 30) 59% 32% 55m 118
(85%, 30) 0% 0% 4m 1
(70%, 45) 69% 24% 58m 112
(75%, 45) 2% 9% 5m 19
(80%, 45) 0% 0% 4m 1
(70%, 50) 67% 26% 1h 7m 123
d) Extrapolation: RirRPS is a 2-player, zero-sum and
simultaneous game. Our experimental results may not extend
to n-players or general-sum games. Moreover, following the
dimensionality-based definition of the complexity of a game
[4], the lower-bound on the complexity of RPS and, inciden-
tally, RirRPS are rather low. Therefore, it would be interesting
to compare current results with games of verifiably greater
lower-bound on their complexity, such as RoboSumo [31].
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X. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
Building on our original work [28], this paper presents a
general framework in which to define SP training schemes.
This is done by formalizing the notion of a menagerie, a
policy sampling distribution and a curator (gating) function.
This framework is framed as theoretical approximation to a
solution concept in MARL, under stated assumptions. The
framework’s generalizing capabilities have been showcased
by capturing existing SP algorithms within it. We have also
identified shortcomings of some of the captured methods, and
have proposed methods which could potentially overcome said
issues. Through a qualitative study we have showcased that,
on a simple environment, different SP algorithms differ in how
the joint policy space is explored. We have also carried out
a quantitative analysis on (1) the evolution of policies being
trained under different SP algorithms to discover cyclic policy
evolutions and (2) the relative performance between various
SP algorithms.
Future work will study other possibilities presented within
the expressive capabilities of our SP framework. For instance,
there is no research exploring which policy sampling distri-
bution works best for different types of environments. Fur-
thermore, it may even be possible to learn a policy sampling
distribution or curator during training using meta RL.
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